UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 22-2197

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

MASHAQ WHITE,
Appellant

On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, E.D. Pa.
Judge Karen S. Marston, No. 2:21-cr-00237-001

Before: KRAUSE, FREEMAN, and ROTH, *Circuit Judges*
Argued: July 7, 2026; Filed: Nov. 6, 2026

OPINION OF THE COURT

FREEMAN, *Circuit Judge*. At Mashaq White's sentencing, he unsuccessfully argued that he was not subject to a certain enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The fate of that argument turned on White's prior conviction for Pennsylvania third-degree felony robbery under subsection 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(1)(v) ("Pennsylvania F3 robbery"). According to White, that Pennsylvania robbery statute is broader than generic robbery and thus does not qualify as the enumerated offense of "robbery" in the Guidelines' definition of a "crime of violence." White is

correct, so we will VACATE his sentence and REMAND to the District Court for resentencing.

I.

In June 2020, Philadelphia Police responded to reports of a burglary in progress at a Rite Aid store. When they arrived at the Rite Aid, they saw White running down an aisle with a gun in his hand. An officer tackled White, arrested him, and recovered a semiautomatic pistol. Based on those events, a grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging White with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). White pleaded guilty to the charge.

At sentencing, the parties disputed whether White's prior conviction for Pennsylvania F3 robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence" for purposes of the sentencing enhancement set forth in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1).[1] As relevant here, a defendant is eligible for that enhancement if he has two

[1] In the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), the Probation Office stated that Pennsylvania F3 robbery is not a "crime of violence." The government raised no objections to the PSR, but it later disputed the Pennsylvania F3 robbery issue in its sentencing memorandum and during the sentencing hearing. White argued to the District Court that the government's failure to raise a timely objection to the PSR violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, but White does not pursue that argument on appeal.

prior felony convictions for "a crime of violence," as that term is defined in the Guidelines. U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(1), 4B1.2(a). White has the requisite two prior convictions only if Pennsylvania F3 robbery is a "crime of violence." The District Court concluded that it is.

The U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1) enhancement raised White's base offense level, which caused his advisory Guidelines range to increase from 100 to 125 months' imprisonment to 140 to 175 months' imprisonment. Because a § 922(g)(1) conviction carried a 120-month statutory maximum sentence at the time of White's offense, 120 months became the advisory sentence by operation of law.

Based on evidence of White's troubled background, the District Court granted a modest downward variance and imposed a sentence of 110 months' imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.

II.[2]

Under Section 2K2.1(a)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant is subject to an increased base offense

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[2] The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Whether an offense qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines is a question of law subject to our plenary review. *United States v. Quinnones*, 16 F.4th 414, 417 n.2 (3d Cir. 2021).

level if (1) his offense involved a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine, and (2) he committed the offense "subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense." U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1).

All agree that White's offense involved a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. All also agree that White has at least one prior conviction that qualifies as a "crime of violence." The only question is whether his Pennsylvania F3 robbery conviction constitutes a second prior conviction for a "crime of violence."

The Guidelines define a "crime of violence" as follows:

> [A]ny offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that—
>
> > (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or
> >
> > (2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense,

> robbery, arson, extortion, or the use or unlawful possession of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2021). Subsection (1) is known as the "elements clause," while Subsection (2) is known as the "enumerated offenses clause." *United States v. Ramos*, 892 F.3d 599, 605 (3d Cir. 2018).

Years before White's sentencing, we held that Pennsylvania F3 robbery does not satisfy the elements clause. *See United States v. Peppers*, 899 F.3d 211, 233 (3d Cir. 2018); *United States v. Henderson*, 80 F.4th 207, 212 n.5 (3d Cir. 2023). So the only question here is whether Pennsylvania F3 robbery amounts to "robbery" as listed in the enumerated offenses clause. To discern whether it does, we apply the categorical approach: We "compare the elements of the statute forming the basis of the defendant's conviction with the elements of the 'generic' crime—*i.e.*, the offense as commonly understood." *United States v. Brown*, 765 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2014), *as amended* (Nov. 4, 2014) (quoting *Descamps v. United States*, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013)). "If the statute of conviction has the same elements as the generic offense, or if the statute defines the offense more narrowly, then the prior conviction is a categorical match and can serve as a predicate

offense for a sentencing enhancement." *United States v. Brasby*, 61 F.4th 127, 134 (3d Cir. 2023). However, if "the state offense allows for conviction on a broader basis than the generic offense, it may not be considered for purposes of sentence enhancement." *United States v. Graves*, 877 F.3d 494, 501 (3d Cir. 2017).

A.

A person is guilty of Pennsylvania F3 robbery "if, in the course of committing a theft, he . . . physically takes or removes property from the person of another *by force however slight*." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(1)(v) (2014) (emphasis added); *id.* § 3701(b)(1). In *Commonwealth v. Brown*, 484 A.2d 738 (Pa. 1984), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the degree of force required for an F3 robbery conviction. In that case, the victim "heard running steps behind her. The purse slung over her arm was grabbed and she saw [Brown] run away from her with the purse." *Id.* at 740. Brown was convicted of F3 robbery and appealed, arguing that these facts were insufficient to meet § 3701(a)(1)(v)'s "force however slight" requirement. *Id.*

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed. It stated "that any amount of force applied to a person while committing a theft brings that act within the scope of" Pennsylvania F3 robbery. *Id.* at 741. So "[t]he degree of actual force" used in a particular case "is immaterial, so long as it is sufficient to separate the victim from his property in, on or about his body." *Id.* By way of examples, it said "[a]ny injury to the victim, or

any struggle to obtain the property, or any resistance on his part which requires a greater counter attack to effect the taking is sufficient." *Id.* But it also clarified that "even . . . the slight tug on the arm by the purse thief who must use force to wrench the purse from the arm of the victim without regard to her safety" suffices to meet the force requirement. *Id.* at 742.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused particular attention on the victim's awareness as a critical requirement of Pennsylvania F3 robbery. It explained that pickpocketing is distinct from third-degree robbery because the victim is not aware of the former: a pickpocket "us[es] no force or threat of force on the victim" and "poses no threat to the victim *who is unaware of the taking*. . . ." *Id.* (emphasis added). By contrast, "[a] victim who is aware of the taking of property from his person is apt to reflex action to protect himself and his property and thus may be injured by the felon." *Id.*

The Court concluded that when Brown "snatch[ed] the purse from [the victim]," he perpetrated "a harmful touching of the person, accompanied with sufficient force to compel the victim to part with the conscious control of her property." *Id.* at 742 & n.4. It pointed out that the trial evidence showed the victim "was aware of [Brown] and within seconds of the robbery was chasing after him," and it concluded that this satisfied the statute's force requirement. *Id.* at 742.

When the *Brown* Court categorized purse-snatching offenses as robberies—even where the only evidence of force is the force used to "separate the victim from his property," *id.*

at 741—it put Pennsylvania law at odds with most other jurisdictions. A large majority of jurisdictions classify snatching offenses as larcenies, not robberies; they save robbery offenses for those requiring more force. *See* 3 Wayne R. LaFave, *Substantive Criminal Law* § 20.3(d)(1) (3d ed. 2025) ("The great weight of authority . . . supports the view that there is not sufficient force to constitute robbery when the thief snatches property from the owner's grasp so suddenly that the owner cannot offer any resistance to the taking."); 2 Jens David Ohlin, *Wharton's Criminal Law* § 31:12 (16th ed. 2025) ("The taking of property from the person of another by surprise, as by a sudden snatching, does not constitute robbery. Thus, the sudden snatching of a purse or other property from a person's hand is not robbery."); 67 Am. Jur. 2d *Robbery* § 30 (2026) ("[P]urse snatching is not a 'robbery' if no force was used other than that necessary to take the victim's purse."); *New Jersey v. Sein*, 590 A.2d 665, 667–68 (N.J. 1991) (recognizing that Pennsylvania law rejects "[t]he predominant view . . . that there is insufficient force to constitute robbery when the thief snatches property from the owner's grasp so suddenly that the owner cannot offer any resistance to the taking," and instead holds that "the amount of physical energy necessary to take the property is deemed sufficient to support a robbery conviction").

Of course, Pennsylvania is free to define its state crimes differently from other jurisdictions. And Pennsylvania's highest court did just that in *Brown* when it effectively held that evidence of a taking from the victim, paired with the

victim's awareness of the taking, is sufficient to satisfy Pennsylvania F3 robbery's force requirement. *See Brown*, 484 A.2d at 743 (Zappala, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority "has effectively concluded that a taking from the person involves force per se" and noting the majority's emphasis on the victim's awareness of the taking).[3]

Our Court has had previous occasion to discuss the force required for Pennsylvania F3 robbery. In *Peppers*, we asked whether Pennsylvania F3 robbery categorically qualifies

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[3] Subsequent Pennsylvania court decisions have reaffirmed that the mere taking from a victim, with the victim's awareness, satisfies the force requirement for Pennsylvania F3 robbery. *See Commonwealth v. Bedell*, 954 A.2d 1209, 1215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (affirming conviction for Pennsylvania F3 robbery where the defendant "took the wallet out of the victim's hand and ran away with it," and emphasizing that "[t]he victim was fully aware of the taking"); *Commonwealth v. Williams*, 550 A.2d 579, 582 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) ("[T]he phrase 'force however slight' envisions that the victim must be aware of the force and, because of the force, feel compelled to part with his or her property."); *id.* (reversing F3 robbery conviction where defendant rolled the unconscious victim onto his side to remove his wallet because "the victim was not aware of any force"); *see also Commonwealth v. Jones*, 771 A.2d 796, 799 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (explaining that "[a] purse-snatcher . . . is guilty of robbery, as the victim is aware of the force," even where there is "no force directed at the purse-snatch victim").

as a "violent felony" as defined by the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"). 899 F.3d at 230–34. The ACCA's definition of a "violent felony" contains an elements clause that is identical to the one in the Guidelines' definition of a "crime of violence." *See id*. at 231 (addressing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)'s elements clause, which defines "violent felony" as any crime that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another"). We held that Pennsylvania F3 robbery does not satisfy the ACCA's elements clause because the state statute "proscribe[s] the merest touching," which is less force than required under the ACCA. *Peppers*, 899 F.3d at 233.[4] Because we interpret the elements clauses in the ACCA and the Guidelines consistently, Pennsylvania F3 robbery does not satisfy the Guidelines' elements clause either. *See Henderson*, 80 F.4th at 212 n.5.

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[4] In *Peppers*, we observed that "the phrase 'physical force' in the ACCA's elements clause 'means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.'" 899 F.3d at 233 (quoting *Johnson v. United States*, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)). We further observed that "'physical force' under the ACCA's elements clause is not 'satisfied by the merest touching.'" *Id.* (quoting *Johnson*, 559 U.S. at 139). Accordingly, we concluded that "the merest touching" proscribed by Pennsylvania F3 robbery was "insufficient conduct to meet the 'physical force' requirement under the ACCA's elements clause." *Id.*

As explained further below, our observation in *Peppers* that Pennsylvania F3 robbery is satisfied by "the merest touching" bears on today's question: whether that offense is broader than the enumerated offense of "robbery."

B.

White was sentenced under the 2021 version of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. That version of the Guidelines did not define "robbery" for purposes of the enumerated offenses clause, so we apply the generic version of the offense.[5] *United States v. Marrero*, 743 F.3d 389, 398–99 (3d Cir. 2014), *abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States*, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). Generic robbery is "the taking of property from another person or from the immediate presence of another person by force or by intimidation." *United States v. Scott*, 14 F.4th 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2021) (citation modified). And "generic robbery requires no more than *de minimis* force." *Graves*, 877 F.3d at 503. But we have never addressed precisely what "*de minimis* force" means in this context. We do so now, as it is necessary to our application of the categorical approach.

[5] In November 2023, after White's sentencing, the Sentencing Commission amended § 4B1.2 to include a definition for robbery. Amend. 822, U.S.S.G. App. C (Vol. IV), at 244–45 (codified at U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(e)(3)).

1.

Two years after we concluded that generic robbery requires no more than *de minimis* force, the Supreme Court decided *Stokeling v. United States*, 586 U.S. 73 (2019). There, the Court discussed the degree of force required for common law robbery: "the use of force sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance." *Id.* at 75, 77–82. Although *Stokeling* did not directly address the requirements of generic robbery, the parties here agree that the force requirement *Stokeling* articulated for common law robbery applies equally to generic robbery. That agreement is well-founded.

As *Stokeling* observed, at least as of 1986, "a significant majority of the States defined nonaggravated robbery as requiring force that overcomes a victim's resistance." *Id.* at 80–81. That supports a conclusion that generic robbery and common law robbery share the same force requirement. *See Brasby*, 61 F.4th at 138 (explaining that the approach of the majority of state statutes defining the crime is generally "helpful in determining the generic definition of an offense"). And several of our sister circuits have recognized that the force required for generic robbery is the same as that required for common law robbery, as articulated in *Stokeling*. *See United States v. Parham*, 129 F.4th 280, 287 (4th Cir. 2025) ("As for the amount of force that makes the crime [generic] robbery, it has to be enough force to overcome the victim's resistance or force that is more than necessary to simply remove an item from the victim's grasp."); *United States v. Smith*, 928 F.3d

714, 716–17 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding that, after *Stokeling*, the level of force required by the ACCA's elements clause—force sufficient to overcome the victim's resistance—is the same level of force necessary to commit generic robbery); *United States v. Lockley*, 632 F.3d 1238, 1241–44 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the elements of Florida robbery—which requires the use of force sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance—and generic robbery "are clear equivalents"). So we agree with the parties that generic robbery (like common law robbery) requires force sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance.[6]

2.

Stokeling also illustrates what conduct constitutes "force sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance" and what conduct does not. *Stokeling* addressed a Florida robbery statute that proscribes the "taking of . . . property . . . from the person or custody of another, . . . when in the course of the

[6] This conclusion is buttressed by a 2023 amendment to the Guidelines that (1) defines "robbery" as used in the Guidelines' enumerated offenses clause, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), and (2) specifies that the enumerated offense of robbery requires "force that is sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance," U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(e)(3) (2023). In adding the amendment, the Commission explained that the requirement of "force sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance" was drawn directly from *Stokeling*. Amend. 822, U.S.S.G. App. C (Vol. IV), at 247.

taking there is the use of force. . . ." 586 U.S. at 76 (citation omitted). The Florida Supreme Court made clear that "use of force" under the statute requires "resistance by the victim that is overcome by the physical force of the offender." 586 U.S. at 86 (quoting *Robinson v. State,* 692 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1997)). So the question before the United States Supreme Court was whether "the use of force sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance necessitates the use of 'physical force'" as required under the ACCA's elements clause. 586 U.S. at 75.

The Court said it does. In doing so, it explained that common law robbery requires a degree of force sufficient to "overcome [the victim's] resistance[,] . . . however slight the resistance." *Id.* at 79 (citation modified). And "the force necessary to overcome a victim's physical resistance . . . suggests a degree of power that ***would not be satisfied by the merest touching***." *Id.* at 83 (citation modified and emphasis added). The Court then concluded that the ACCA's elements clause "encompasses the degree of force necessary to commit common-law robbery." *Id.* at 86. And because Florida robbery requires that same degree of force, Florida robbery satisfies the ACCA's elements clause. *Id.*

As particularly relevant here, the Supreme Court recognized that Florida courts distinguish between the physical force sufficient to overcome the victim's resistance and the "[m]ere 'snatching of property from another.'" *Id.* at 86 (quoting *Robinson*, 692 So. 2d at 886). Florida robbery requires the former, and the latter "will not suffice." *Id.* Thus,

"a defendant who merely snatches money from the victim's hand and runs away has not committed robbery." *Id.* Similarly, "a defendant who steals a gold chain does not use [force sufficient to overcome the victim's resistance] simply because the victim feels his fingers on the back of her neck." *Id.* (citation modified). And because Florida robbery and common law robbery "require[] that same degree of 'force,'" *id.*, these distinctions apply equally to common law robbery (and, as discussed above, generic robbery).

All told, after *Stokeling*, it is clear that a "mere snatching" offense does not necessitate the use of force sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance. Therefore, a mere snatching offense does not qualify as common law or generic robbery. *See Delligatti v. United States*, 604 U.S. 423, 450 (2025) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (reiterating *Stokeling*'s holding that the amount of force sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance "does not encompass the merest touching, or simply snatching of property from another" (citation modified)); *see also United States v. Rabb*, 942 F.3d 1, 5–7 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that generic robbery does not encompass "a sudden purse snatching" and citing *Stokeling* to support that conclusion).

C.

We now compare the elements of White's Pennsylvania F3 robbery offense and the generic offense of robbery. The dispositive question is whether Pennsylvania F3 robbery's

force requirement is the same as or narrower than generic robbery's force requirement. It is not.

To recap, generic robbery (like common law robbery) requires force that is sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance. *See Stokeling*, 586 U.S. at 79; *supra* Section II.B.1. By contrast, Pennsylvania F3 robbery requires "force however slight," 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(1)(v), which encompasses "the merest touching," *Peppers*, 899 F.3d at 233 (discussing *Brown*, 484 A.2d at 741). And the Supreme Court observed in *Stokeling* that the force required for common law robbery—force sufficient to overcome the victim's resistance—"[is] *not* . . . satisfied by the merest touching." *Stokeling*, 586 U.S. at 83 (citation modified and emphasis added). So the same is true for generic robbery. *See supra* Section II.B.1.

Because an individual can commit Pennsylvania F3 robbery using less force (i.e., the merest touching) than that required to commit generic robbery (i.e., force necessary to overcome a victim's resistance), Pennsylvania F3 robbery is broader than generic robbery.

This conclusion is reinforced by Pennsylvania courts' treatment of mere snatching offenses. As discussed above, Pennsylvania law establishes that a typical purse snatching qualifies as F3 robbery even in the absence of any resistance from the victim. *See supra* Section II.A. Such was the case in *Brown*, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the force used to "snatch the purse from [the victim]" satisfied the force requirement of the F3 robbery statute, even though there

was no evidence of struggle or resistance. 484 A.2d at 742 & n.4; *see id.* at 743 (Zappala, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for holding that "a mere taking from the person" meets § 3701(a)(1)(v)'s force requirement); *see also Commonwealth v. Bedell*, 954 A.2d 1209, 1215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (upholding conviction for Pennsylvania F3 robbery where the defendant "took the wallet out of the victim's hand and ran away with it"). By contrast, evidence of *some* resistance, however slight, by the victim is required for a defendant's use of force to constitute generic robbery. That is why "a defendant who merely snatches money from the victim's hand and runs away" has not committed generic robbery. *See Stokeling*, 586 U.S. at 86; *Rabb*, 942 F.3d at 5–7. Because Pennsylvania F3 robbery encompasses sudden snatching offenses and does not require evidence of resistance, it is broader than generic robbery and thus does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines.

The government resists this conclusion by invoking our decision in *Graves*. There, we concluded that North Carolina common law robbery is the categorical equivalent of generic robbery. 877 F.3d at 500–04. As relevant here, we observed that both require only *de minimis* force. *Id.* The government contends that Pennsylvania F3 robbery and North Carolina common law robbery have substantively identical *de minimis* force requirements, so, under *Graves*, Pennsylvania F3 robbery categorically matches generic robbery.

We disagree. What we referred to in *Graves* as the "*de minimis* force" requirement of North Carolina robbery is, in fact, force sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance. *See id.* at 502 (explaining that North Carolina law recognizes robbery "where the only 'force' demonstrated at trial was the defendant's act of pushing the victim's hands off of a box of cigarettes" (citing *North Carolina v. Chance*, 662 S.E.2d 405, 2008 WL 2415981, at *3–4 (N.C. Ct. App. June 17, 2008) (unpublished))); *see also United States v. Dinkins*, 928 F.3d 349, 357 (4th Cir. 2019) ("North Carolina's case law establishes that the state's common law robbery offense requires the use of force sufficient to overcome the victim's resistance. . . .").[7] And consistent with the majority of jurisdictions, North Carolina law recognizes that sudden snatching offenses require less force than what suffices to

[7] In *Chance*, when the defendant pushed the victim's hands off the cigarette box, he used force sufficient to overcome the victim's resistance. *See Dinkins*, 928 F.3d at 357 ("[U]nder the plain language of *Chance*, the defendant used force sufficient to overcome resistance by the victim."); *cf. Stokeling*, 586 U.S. at 86 (explaining that the force used to "grab[] the victim's fingers and peel[] them back to steal money" amounts to force sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance); *United States v. Love*, 7 F.4th 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2021) ("Mere snatching of property from another without overcoming any resistance does not satisfy robbery statutes requiring force to overcome resistance. But grabbing a victim's fingers and peeling them back to steal money constitutes robbery under such a statute.").

overcome a victim's resistance. *See North Carolina v. Robertson*, 531 S.E.2d 490, 493 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding there was insufficient force to sustain a robbery conviction where the only force "was that sufficient to remove [the victim's] purse from her shoulder"); *United States v. Gattis*, 877 F.3d 150, 159 (4th Cir. 2017) ("[T]o commit robbery by force in North Carolina, the defendant must do more than . . . suddenly snatch; he must direct a degree of force towards the victim beyond the minimum necessary to remove the item from the victim's grasp.").

Not so in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania courts expressly designate purse-snatching offenses as F3 robberies. *See Brown*, 484 A.2d at 741–42 (concluding that "even . . . the slight tug on the arm" of the victim suffices to make purse snatching an F3 robbery); *Commonwealth v. Moore*, 494 A.2d 447, 450 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) ("It is readily apparent that the most common crime intended to fall under section 3701(a)(1)(v) is purse snatching . . . ."). And Pennsylvania F3 robbery requires no more force than that necessary to separate the victim from her property. *See Brown*, 484 A.2d at 741–42; *Bedell*, 954 A.2d at 1215. So the force required for North Carolina common law robbery and Pennsylvania F3 robbery are not coextensive. The Pennsylvania statute is satisfied by a lesser degree of force and therefore sweeps more broadly. That means *Graves* does not support the government's position here.

Because Pennsylvania F3 robbery is broader than generic robbery, White does not have the two prior felonies meeting the Guidelines' definition of a "crime of violence." We will vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing without application of the U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1) enhancement.

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For these reasons, we will VACATE White's sentence and REMAND for resentencing.

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