How Courts Used Compassionate Release to Fix Unfair Sentences in 2020

In 2020, once the First Step Act let prisoners file their own compassionate release motions, some federal judges used them to reduce sentences they saw as unfair, including mandatory life terms and stacked § 924(c) sentences. Much of that has since been narrowed, most recently by the Supreme Court in 2026, so this article is best read as history.

Update (October 2026): This article describes the law as of mid-2020. Much has changed:

• New policy statement. On November 1, 2023, the Sentencing Commission rewrote USSG §1B1.13. It now applies to motions prisoners file themselves. It lists medical, age, family, and abuse-in-custody reasons, plus "other reasons" of similar weight. It also added an "unusually long sentence" reason for people who have served at least 10 years. It says rehabilitation alone is not enough, though it can count along with other reasons.
• Rutherford v. United States (May 28, 2026). The Supreme Court held that a change in sentencing law that Congress did not make retroactive, like the First Step Act's end to § 924(c) "stacking," cannot be an extraordinary and compelling reason, alone or combined with other factors. The Court said the policy statement is invalid to the extent it says otherwise (opinion). This undercuts the stacked § 924(c) cases discussed below. Its reasoning may also affect claims based on other changes Congress did not make retroactive, such as the § 851 changes.
• Fernandez v. United States (May 28, 2026). The Supreme Court held that a claim that a conviction is invalid belongs in a § 2255 motion, not a compassionate release motion (opinion).
• Exhaustion. Federal appeals courts have since ruled on the filing requirement. For example, the Sixth Circuit held in United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831 (6th Cir. 2020), that it is a mandatory rule the court must enforce when the government raises it.

Many of the district court cases below would likely come out differently today. Read them as history, not current law.

This article by Dale Chappell first appeared in the September 2020 issue of Criminal Legal News. It is reprinted here with permission. Copyright 2020 Criminal Legal News. Mr. Chappell and Criminal Legal News agreed to let us share the CLN-edited version.

Who would have predicted that courts would use compassionate release for non-medical reasons, including fixing unfair sentences when no other path exists? But once the First Step Act of 2018 let prisoners file their own compassionate release motions, instead of waiting for the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to do it, courts began citing "fundamental fairness" to right all kinds of wrongs they could not reach before.

Compassionate release is a court order that shortens a federal sentence for "extraordinary and compelling reasons."

Compassionate release is no longer up to the BOP alone

Before the First Step Act, only the BOP could ask a court for compassionate release. In practice, you literally had to be on your deathbed. Your odds of winning were about as good as being struck by lightning and attacked by a shark on the same day. People died while the BOP denied requests or dragged its feet on others.

Congress noticed, and in the First Step Act it pushed the BOP out of the way. Now prisoners can file their own motions if the BOP refuses or ignores their requests. It was the first major change to the compassionate release law in decades, and it has been a game-changer.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the BOP Director used to be the gatekeeper. A court could not reduce a sentence for compassionate release except "upon motion of the Director of the [BOP]." The First Step Act ended that exclusive power by adding the words "or upon motion of the defendant."

As one court put it, "Defendants no longer need the blessing of the BOP to bring such motions." The court also said that once a prisoner files a motion in the sentencing court, the BOP "may never weigh in or provide guidance" on whether it should be granted. U.S. v. Haynes, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71021 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2020).

Several courts said the amended law "vests courts with independent discretion" to grant compassionate release. U.S. v. Hope, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85395 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2020). In fact, "the district court assumes the same discretion as the BOP Director when it considers a compassionate release motion." U.S. v. Brown, 411 F. Supp. 3d 446 (S.D. Iowa 2019).

Why did Congress take this power from the BOP and share it with prisoners? Because the BOP rarely used it. In 2013, the Justice Department's Office of the Inspector General (OIG), which investigates misconduct by government agencies, issued a report. It found that over six years, the BOP filed zero compassionate release motions for non-medical reasons and only 24 for medical reasons. That was out of about 220,000 prisoners in its custody. When the OIG told the BOP to do better, the BOP approved only 83 requests the next year. See U.S. v. Ebbers, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3746 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2020) (describing the OIG report).

"Extraordinary and compelling" reasons are not just about illness

The law says a court can reduce a sentence for "extraordinary and compelling reasons," but it does not say what that means. Instead, it points to the Sentencing Commission's policy statement, USSG §1B1.13. In 2020, that policy had not been updated since before the First Step Act. It still said only the BOP could file a motion, and it focused mainly on medical reasons, like the BOP's own policy.

That conflict split the courts on whether §1B1.13 still applied. See U.S. v. Fox, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115388 (D. Me. July 11, 2019) (collecting cases). In U.S. v. Cantu, 423 F. Supp. 3d 345 (S.D. Tex. 2019), the court found that §1B1.13 "clearly contradicts" the First Step Act's changes. Because Congress changed the law to expand compassionate release, the court said, the old policy "no longer fits with the statute and thus does not comply with the congressional mandate." Haynes noted that "at least twelve other federal district courts" had held §1B1.13 did not apply to motions filed by prisoners. (As noted above, the Commission updated the policy in 2023.)

Haynes also pointed out that "the district courts have always had the discretion to determine what counts as compelling and extraordinary." Courts were never a "rubber stamp" for the BOP, the court said. The First Step Act's "key change" was "the removal of the [BOP] Director's role as a gatekeeper."

In U.S. v. Millan, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59955 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2020), Judge Loretta A. Preska listed many reasons that were "extraordinary and compelling." Millan was "unconditionally rehabilitated" after taking dozens of BOP programs. He was remorseful. He was a "model inmate" and a "leader of the religious community" in prison. And he worked with at-risk youth. Notice that none of these are medical reasons. The judge cited none, yet she granted compassionate release to fix an unfair sentence.

One thing has not changed. The court must still weigh the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) before reducing a sentence. These include:

1. the seriousness of the offense;
2. your personal history and characteristics;
3. the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense;
4. the need to deter crime;
5. the need to protect the public from more crimes by you (this is the one the government presses hardest);
6. the need to provide you with rehabilitation;
7. the guidelines range; and
8. the need to avoid unfair gaps in sentences between people with similar crimes and records.

The sentence must also be no longer than necessary to meet the purposes of sentencing. And the court has broad discretion on whether to grant compassionate release. See U.S. v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 2020) (setting the standard for when a court abuses its discretion in granting or denying compassionate release). This means all of your prison conduct, good and bad, comes into play.

What courts did with non-medical compassionate release in 2020

Somewhat surprisingly, courts used compassionate release to fix unfair sentences and give other relief where no path existed before. They reduced mandatory life sentences for drug offenses and stacked § 924(c) sentences that they had no other way to change.

Mandatory life sentences for drug offenses

During the "war on drugs" era, Congress let prosecutors force a judge to sentence some repeat drug offenders to life without parole, even if their prior convictions were for simple possession. Prosecutors did this by filing a notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851. If the government asked for that sentence, the judge had no say.

Judges across the country criticized this. In the author's view, prosecutors convinced Congress that they needed these mandatory sentences to pressure drug defendants into pleading guilty and cooperating. Until the First Step Act, Congress let them have their way.

The First Step Act changed some of this. For people with two qualifying prior convictions, it lowered the mandatory sentence from life to 25 years. It also changed what counts as a qualifying prior conviction to match the Armed Career Criminal Act's "serious drug offense" definition, which leaves out simple possession priors. See 21 U.S.C. § 851; 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The mandatory minimum for people with only one drug prior was also reduced. But Congress did not make these changes retroactive.

With compassionate release, courts found a way to go back and change § 851 sentences they never wanted to impose. In Hope, Judge Kathleen M. Williams used compassionate release to reduce a § 851 life sentence imposed 30 years earlier to time served. She noted that if Hope were sentenced today, he would face less time than he had already served.

Judge Williams rejected each of the government's arguments: that Hope had no health problems, that his drug offense did not involve crack cocaine (the only drug change the First Step Act made retroactive), and that Congress did not make the § 851 changes retroactive. She wrote:

District courts around the country have recognized that defendants are entitled to relief under the First Step Act for "extraordinary and compelling reasons" including the sentencing disparities occasioned by promulgation of the Act.

And:

Other courts have found that sentencing disparities like that presented in Mr. Hope's case, coupled with a demonstration of profound rehabilitation, constitutes "extraordinary and compelling" circumstances sufficient to warrant a sentence reduction.

Judge Williams was not alone. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mondaca, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37483 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2020) (Judge Dana Sabraw granting relief).

Stacked § 924(c) sentences

Section 924(c) adds prison time for using a gun during a crime of violence or drug crime. Stacked § 924(c) sentences got a lot of attention in non-medical compassionate release cases.

Before the First Step Act, each § 924(c) conviction after the first carried a 25-year mandatory sentence, served back to back with everything else. This is called "stacking." So prosecutors could threaten to pile on § 924(c) charges, adding up to what amounted to a life sentence, if a person turned down a plea offer. That was legal. Judges complained about it for years. It tied their hands and required very long sentences. In the author's view, the practice was unethical and of doubtful constitutionality.

The First Step Act, § 403(a), changed § 924(c). Now the 25-year term applies only if an earlier § 924(c) conviction was already final. That mostly ended stacking.

In Haynes, the court criticized how the government punished Haynes for going to trial. Haynes was charged with several bank robberies in the early 1990s and just one § 924(c) count. The government offered about 8 years if he pled guilty: 3 years for one bank robbery plus 5 years in a row for the § 924(c) count. The offer warned: "If the defendant fails to [take the offer], the government will seek to obtain a superseding indictment charging the appropriate additional counts under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)." When Haynes went to trial, the government did just that.

The First Step Act took away this power, but not retroactively. Still, Judge Dearie granted Haynes' motion. He made several points:

• Haynes' codefendant took a deal, got out, robbed another bank, and would still finish his second sentence long before Haynes finished his first.
• Haynes' stacked § 924(c) sentence was longer than the average federal sentences for murder, child pornography, extortion, and terrorism offenses.
• Congress called its change a "clarification of § 924(c)." That was a "clear message" that Congress "never intended that the brutal sentence [Haynes] is serving be imposed."
• The fact that the change is not retroactive "simply establishes that a defendant sentenced before the [First Step Act] is not automatically entitled to resentencing." It would be reasonable for Congress to expect courts to grant relief for stacked sentences "on a case-by-case basis."

The court held that the First Step Act's "elimination of the § 924(c) sentencing weaponry that prosecutors employed to require [Haynes'] sentence" was an extraordinary and compelling reason. It cited other courts that had granted compassionate release for stacked § 924(c) sentences.

(As noted above, the Supreme Court's 2026 decision in Rutherford rejected this reasoning.)

In Millan, noted above, the court also used compassionate release to undo an unfair life sentence under the "continuing criminal enterprise" law. Compassionate release is clearly not just for medical reasons anymore.

And compassionate release does not have to mean release. The law says a court "may reduce the term of imprisonment." Release itself is not required. In Carter v. U.S., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68343 (D. Md. Apr. 17, 2020), Judge Ellen L. Hollander reduced a life sentence to a term of years over the government's objection.

Getting started: the request to the warden

Even for non-medical compassionate release, you must first make a written request to the BOP (the warden) before you can file in court. The law says you may file after you have "fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden."

In 2020, courts were divided over whether you had to finish the whole BOP appeal process first (the BP-8, BP-9 and so on). Most said you could, but you did not have to. You could just wait 30 days and file.

The government won some arguments that a prisoner must go through the whole administrative remedy process, which can take up to six months. See U.S. v. Arthaloney, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89245 (D. Neb. May 21, 2020) ("if the warden denied the request within 30 days of receipt, the defendant must exhaust administrative remedies"). In the author's view, this ignores that the law gives two separate options: exhaust administrative remedies, or wait 30 days.

In Millan, the court found the requirement was met after 30 days passed from the warden's receipt of Millan's written request. The date of receipt counts, not the date you send it. See U.S. v. Miller, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80817 (D. Idaho May 6, 2020). The request does not have to be formal, like a BP-9. A "cop-out" (an informal inmate request to staff) can work as a written request.

But finishing the administrative remedy process has a benefit. The First Step Act added 18 U.S.C. § 3582(d), which requires the BOP to report each year on the compassionate release requests it receives and how they turn out, even if the prisoner filed his own motion. According to the author, the BOP has to include only cases where administrative remedies were exhausted. So the author suggests still filing your BP-9, BP-10 and BP-11, even if you go to court after waiting only 30 days.

As of 2020, no federal appeals court had decided whether an emergency, like a deadly virus such as COVID-19, could excuse the first request to the BOP. District courts had held that the requirement is set by law and cannot be waived. But you can file again once you meet it. (Since then, appeals courts have ruled on this. See the update note above.)

For non-medical compassionate release, the BOP process may be a waste of time. The BOP's compassionate release policy, Program Statement 5050.50, was amended after the First Step Act. But it lets the BOP seek release only for medical, age-related, and certain family reasons (like the death or incapacity of a child's caregiver). It does not cover unfair-sentence reasons like the ones above. Could exhaustion be "futile" in those cases? In 2020, there was not much case law on this yet.

What this means now

Letting prisoners file for compassionate release gave courts a way to fix unfair sentences they could not fix before the First Step Act. In the author's view, the key was finding a sympathetic judge and filing the motion the right way. If your judge did not want to impose the sentence she did, look for evidence of that in the record. It can support why compassionate release is an option now.

Since this article was written, the Commission and the Supreme Court have drawn clearer lines around what counts. Check current law before you file.

By: Dale Chappell

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