When Joint Flight Supports an Official-Victim Increase

On November 10, 2026, the Eighth Circuit filed United States v. Barajas, No. 25-2530. This is a published opinion. The slip does not label the decision unpublished or nonprecedential. The court affirmed the judgment. It held that the district court did not err in adding six levels under USSG §3A1.2(c), because Barajas and a codefendant acted in concert and the codefendant shot at police. Read the decision (PDF).

The slip prints "Filed: November 10, 2026" and does not print a clock time. The court's PDF records a last-modified time of 11:00:02 a.m. Eastern that day (16:00:02 UTC).

What happened

An investigation of a suspicious package ended in a high-speed chase. Barajas threw the package out the window. It contained methamphetamine. His codefendant drove over 100 miles per hour. After the crash, both men tried to run while carrying firearms. An officer drove into Barajas. He fell and dropped the AK-47-style weapon he was holding. The codefendant then shot at police, and the officers returned fire. Both men surrendered and were arrested.

In custody, Barajas made several phone calls. He told an acquaintance to reset his phone, remove its SIM card, and delete his Facebook account.

He pleaded guilty to four federal drug- and firearm-related charges. The opinion names one of them: possession of a firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The opinion does not name the other three counts.

At sentencing he objected to two increases in the presentence report. The first was six levels under §3A1.2(c) for assaulting a law enforcement officer. The district court overruled that objection. It referred to "the Iowa generic definition" of assault and found that the assaultive conduct of Barajas and his codefendant supported the increase. The second was two levels under §3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. The district court overruled that objection as well. It inferred from facts that were not objected to that Barajas wanted the material destroyed because he believed it would hurt him, and it referred to cases about social-media evidence in drug-trafficking cases.

The offense level was 42 and the criminal history category was III. The advisory range was 360 months to life, plus a mandatory minimum of 84 months to be served consecutively on the § 924(c) count. The court imposed what the opinion calls a below-guidelines sentence of 384 months.

The appeal is from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, Eastern Division. The sentencing judge was Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger. Judge Traynor wrote the opinion. Chief Judge Colloton, Judge L.R. Smith, and Judge Traynor heard the case. It was submitted on September 24, 2026, and filed on November 10, 2026.

The six-level official-victim increase

The opinion states the review standard in these words: the court reviews "the district court's construction and application of the sentencing guidelines de novo," and it reviews "factual findings regarding enhancements for clear error." That sentence cites United States v. Bastian, 603 F.3d 460, 465 (8th Cir. 2010), and notes that the citation was modified.

The opinion then states that a six-level increase applies when, during the course of the offense, "the defendant or a person for whose conduct the defendant is otherwise accountable" knowingly assaulted a law enforcement officer. It cites USSG §3A1.2(c). The same subsection in the November 1, 2025 Guidelines Manual, and again in the November 1, 2026 manual, also requires that the assault occur "in a manner creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury," and that it happen "during the course of the offense or immediate flight therefrom," by someone who knows or has reasonable cause to believe the person is a law enforcement officer. The opinion does not say which manual the district court applied.

Application Note 4(A), as the opinion describes it with a modified citation, says the increase "applies in circumstances tantamount to aggravated assault" and covers conduct "sufficiently serious to create at least a substantial risk of serious bodily injury."

"Assault" is not defined in §3A1.2(c). The opinion says the common-law meaning applies, citing United States v. Olson, 646 F.3d 569, 572 (8th Cir. 2011). It quotes Olson for the point that common-law assault includes attempted battery and "an act which is intended to, and reasonably does, cause the victim to fear immediate bodily harm."

The district court used "the Iowa generic definition" of assault. The Eighth Circuit held that, to the extent the district court applied the assault definition in the Iowa Code, it erred. The opinion cites Olson, 646 F.3d at 572, for that point. It then held that the error does not require reversal. On de novo review, the district court's factual findings support the increase. The opinion points to United States v. Fuentes Torres, 529 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2008), as an example of harmless error where a district court misstated the guideline standard. The fact the opinion treats as enough is that the codefendant, acting in concert with Barajas, shot at police.

Why the codefendant's shot counted

Barajas argued that §3A1.2(c) should not reach his codefendant's shot. He relied on United States v. Iron Cloud, 75 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1996). The opinion quotes that case: "in order for conduct of others to be attributable to a defendant" under §3A1.2, "there must be some evidence of causation on the part of the defendant: that is, that the defendant expressly or impliedly ordered, encouraged, or in some way assisted in the assailant's conduct." Iron Cloud, 75 F.3d at 390. Barajas said he did not encourage or assist the shot because the two men "took different approaches to their flight" and "there is no evidence they communicated while fleeing."

The district court distinguished Iron Cloud. In that case, the defendant got out of the car with his hands up before the driver, apparently without a prompt from him, drove the vehicle in reverse. Here, Barajas threw contraband out the window while the codefendant tried to evade police at over 100 miles per hour. Then both fled on foot while armed. The district court said those facts suggested that Barajas was "encouraging or in some way assisting the flight and the assaultive conduct by the codefendant." It found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he "impliedly encouraged and assisted" the codefendant.

The Eighth Circuit accepted that finding. It said it need not address whether Barajas was also accountable for the codefendant's assaultive conduct "as a reasonably foreseeable act under USSG § 1B1.2(a)(1)(B)." That is the citation printed in the opinion. The court found no error in the six-level official-victim increase based on the codefendant's conduct, because the two were acting in concert.

A footnote records a second ground the district court used: Barajas's own conduct in brandishing a loaded AK-47-style gun while fleeing from police. The Eighth Circuit did not review that ground. It said the increase is otherwise justified by the two acting in concert.

The obstruction increase

Barajas also challenged the two-level obstruction increase under USSG §3C1.1. The conduct was the jail calls asking an acquaintance to reset his phone and delete his social-media account.

The court held that any error in those two levels would be harmless. With the six-level official-victim increase in place, the range with or without the obstruction levels is 360 months to life, plus a consecutive 84-month term. The opinion cites United States v. Omar, 567 F.3d 362, 366 (8th Cir. 2009), for that point.

The court also found no clear error. It said the record amply supports the conclusion that the requests amounted to "procuring another person to destroy or conceal evidence that is material to an official investigation or judicial proceeding," within the meaning of §3C1.1, Application Note 4(D). The November 1, 2025 manual, and the November 1, 2026 manual, list as an example of covered conduct "destroying or concealing or directing or procuring another person to destroy or conceal evidence that is material to an official investigation or judicial proceeding." The opinion also cites United States v. Tyus, 167 F.4th 1008, 1014–15 (8th Cir. 2026).

Who it affects

• A person sentenced in Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, or South Dakota, where §3A1.2(c) is at issue. Barajas is a published Eighth Circuit opinion. On these facts, the court counted a codefendant's shot at police toward the defendant's increase when the two acted in concert.
• The concert facts the court relied on were specific. Barajas threw contraband from the car during the chase, and both men then fled on foot while armed. The opinion applies the Iron Cloud requirement that the defendant ordered, encouraged, or assisted the other person's conduct.
• A person whose sentencing judge used a state assault definition for this guideline. The court said use of the Iowa Code definition was error. It also said that error did not require reversal, because the factual findings still supported the increase.
• A person who, after arrest, asked someone else to reset a phone or delete a social-media account. In this record the court treated those calls as obstruction under §3C1.1, note 4(D). It also said the two levels would not have changed a range that was already 360 months to life, plus 84 months consecutive.
• A person sentenced in another circuit. The guideline text is national. Barajas decides the question for the Eighth Circuit. Another circuit applies its own cases.