Juvenile Sentenced as an Adult: Why the Range Began at Life

On November 13, 2026, the Tenth Circuit filed United States v. Martin, No. 25-7057, a published opinion. The court affirmed a 456-month prison sentence for a woman who was 17 and a half when she planned the killing of her parents. It held that the judge did not err by starting from an advisory guideline range of life, even though she was a juvenile at the time, and that the sentence was reasonable. Read the decision (PDF).

What happened

Ashlie Martin, an enrolled member of the Choctaw Nation, persuaded her 15-year-old boyfriend and an 18-year-old friend to kill her parents at their home on the Choctaw Nation Reservation in December 2020. The opinion says she planned the crime but did not take part in the physical attacks.

Because the crime took place in Indian country, it was charged in federal court. The district court transferred her to adult court under 18 U.S.C. § 5032, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the transfer in 2023. She then pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to conspiracy to commit murder in Indian country.

The presentence report (PSR), the probation office's report used at sentencing, set the advisory range at life. The government asked for life and Martin asked for 210 months. The judge granted part of her request for a variance, a sentence outside the range based on the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and imposed 456 months. The two others received 300 months (the 15-year-old) and 420 months (the adult, who got a downward departure for substantial assistance to the government).

Why the range started at life

Conspiracy to commit murder is sentenced under USSG §2A1.5. When the offense results in a death, a cross-reference (an instruction to use a different guideline) sends the court to §2A1.1, first-degree murder, with a base offense level of 43. In criminal history category I, level 43 calls for life.

Martin agreed the math was right. She argued that a judge should not start from an adult life range for someone who was a juvenile, relying on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which held that the Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders.

The Tenth Circuit disagreed. Under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the guidelines are advisory, so a life range is not a mandatory life sentence. A judge still "must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing." The judge did not impose life and said the sentence would be the same even if the calculation were wrong.

The vulnerable-victim increase

The judge added two levels under USSG §3A1.1(b)(1), which covers a victim who is "unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition." The judge found that Martin's father used a walker and a full-time oxygen tank and had serious chronic illnesses. Those findings came from the PSR, based on an FBI interview of Martin's aunt. Martin also admitted at her plea hearing that he used a walker.

Martin called her aunt unreliable. The court found no clear error, the deferential standard for reviewing a judge's fact findings. It held that his specific health conditions, not just his age, made him less able than a healthy person to fend off an attack. It distinguished United States v. Tissnolthtos, 115 F.3d 759 (10th Cir. 1997), where age alone was not enough.

The other sentencing claims

Some arguments got only plain-error review, a hard standard that applies when the specific objection was not made in the district court.

• Harm to the coconspirators. The judge said Martin's actions damaged the two young men's lives. The court said her role in influencing them fits "the nature and circumstances of the offense," and any error was not plain.
• Explaining the variance. The judge did not have to explain in detail why the sentence was not 210 months.
• Disparity. Section 3553(a)(6) looks at uniformity nationally, not between codefendants. Data in the PSR showed an average of 416 months and a median of 470 months for the same offense level and criminal history. Martin's sentence fell between them.

A below-guideline sentence is presumed reasonable when challenged as too harsh. The court said the judge had weighed Martin's childhood, her deficits and her age. The codefendants' shorter terms were explained by the record: one was 15, and the other had cooperated.

The court also held that it had jurisdiction. Conspiracy to commit murder is a federal crime that applies everywhere, so it need not be listed in the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153.

Who it affects

• A young person transferred to adult court in Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, or Wyoming. Martin binds courts in the Tenth Circuit. The range is figured as for an adult. Youth is argued through § 3553(a) and a variance request.
• A person facing the vulnerable-victim increase. Documented facts about a victim's health can support it. Age alone may not. Record evidence works better than a bare attack on a source.
• A person whose codefendant got less time. A gap between codefendants is not, by itself, grounds for relief in this circuit.
• A person preparing for sentencing. Make specific objections at the sentencing hearing. A general objection may leave only plain-error review. Our page on departures and variances explains how a judge can go below the range.