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Why a Judge May Vary Upward Without Warning Before the Hearing

On November 16, 2026, the Eleventh Circuit issued United States v. Rugen, No. 25-12342. The court affirmed a 60-month prison sentence for wire fraud and illegal gun possession. The prosecutor had asked for 46 months. The judge first raised a sentence above the guidelines range at the hearing itself. The court of appeals held that no advance warning was required, because the sentence was a variance and not a departure. Read the decision (PDF).

The opinion is unpublished and unsigned (per curiam).

What happened

Zachary Rugen worked for a small cybersecurity company. According to the opinion, he falsified invoices on a contract in France, overcharged the company, and moved more than $500,000 into an account he could draw from.

FBI agents searched his home and found 9mm handguns and ammunition. Rugen had prior convictions. He pleaded guilty to wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and to possessing a firearm and ammunition after a felony conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor read a statement from the company's owner, and another company official described the harm. Afterward, the judge told defense counsel the court was "considering varying upward from the guidelines." The judge called stealing from an employer that had shown faith in Rugen "such an abuse of trust," and concluded that the guidelines range would not "punish him enough for what he did" and that "an upward variance [was] in order."

Defense counsel objected and said the court had to give notice of an upward variance before sentencing. The judge disagreed and imposed 60 months. The opinion does not state what the guidelines range was.

Departure and variance are different things

Rugen's first argument rested on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h). That rule says that before a court may "depart from the applicable sentencing range" on a ground not identified in the presentence report or a party's prehearing filing, it "must give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a departure."

The rule uses the word "depart." The opinion explains the two terms this way:

  • A departure is a sentence outside the range that a specific provision of the Guidelines Manual authorizes. The Supreme Court has called it "a term of art."
  • A variance is a sentence outside the range that the judge chooses because the range will not serve the purposes of sentencing in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Judges have that power because the guidelines are advisory.

In Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008), the Supreme Court held that Rule 32(h) does not apply to a variance. The Eleventh Circuit applied that holding: a court "must give notice if it is considering a departure, but not if it is considering a variance."

Our guide to departures and variances covers the difference in more detail, including the Sentencing Commission's removal of most departure provisions from the Manual on November 1, 2025. Rugen does not discuss that change.

How the court told which one this was

To tell a departure from a variance, the Eleventh Circuit looks at the judge's reasoning. The opinion lists three signs of a variance: the judge did not cite "a specific guidelines departure provision," the judge's "rationale was based on the § 3553(a) factors," and the judge found that "the guidelines range was inadequate."

All three were present here. The judge said more than once that "an upward variance [was] in order" and cited no departure provision.

Rugen pointed to one remark. The judge had said: "the guidelines are advisory. I can depart upwards. I can depart downwards." The court of appeals called that "a slip of the tongue."

The explanation was enough

Rugen also argued that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable, meaning the judge made a mistake in the way the sentence was reached. He said the judge did not adequately address the § 3553(a) factors or factors supporting a lower sentence.

The court noted that Rugen "never explains what factors he believes the district court overlooked." It also found the explanation sufficient. Under Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007), a judge must "adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review."

Here the judge gave three reasons: the "abuse of trust," the need to "discourage other people," and the view that the range would not punish Rugen enough. The opinion matched those to the circumstances of the offense, the seriousness of the offense, and deterrence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B).

Who it affects

  • People sentenced in the Eleventh Circuit (Alabama, Florida and Georgia). A judge may raise an upward variance for the first time at the hearing. Rugen is unpublished, so it does not bind later panels, but it applies Irizarry, which binds every federal court.
  • Anyone preparing for sentencing. The government's recommendation does not limit the judge. Here the prosecutor asked for 46 months and the judge imposed 60.
  • People surprised by a new ground at the hearing. In Irizarry, the Supreme Court said a judge should "consider granting a continuance" (a postponement) "when a party has a legitimate basis for claiming that the surprise was prejudicial." 553 U.S. at 716. The Rugen opinion does not say that the defense asked for one.

Source: United States v. Rugen, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, No. 25-12342